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Abstract
The 2008-2009 global recession, which originated in developed economies, has 
rapidly spilled over worldwide, hitting different economies with various intensity. The 
Macedonian economy was not an exception - the export sector suffered heavily, ex-
pectations deteriorated and household consumption declined subsequently. In this 
paper we aim to improve our understanding of the effects of the global crisis on the 
Macedonian economy by using disaggregated, firm-level data. As micro data gener-
ally contain richer information compared to aggregated data, this research provides 
useful information for policy-makers regarding the main weaknesses of the domestic 
economy, as well as regarding the actions needed to improve the resilience of the 
economy to future economic distress. The results suggest that firms that produce and 
sell domestically had relatively weaker performance. The trade channel appears im-
portant only for the main exporting group - the metal producers, whereas the financial 
channel did not play a significant role during the crisis. 
Keywords: global crisis, crisis transmission, firm-level data
JEL Classification: F3, O40, F43, D00
Introduction
The 2008-2009 global recession, which originated in developed economies, has 
rapidly spilled over worldwide, hitting different economies with various intensity. The 
Macedonian economy has proven to be relatively resilient to the external shock, with 
real GDP contracting by 1% in 2009. On the other hand domestic exports have suf-
fered heavily declining around 16% in real terms. 
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In this paper we aim to improve our understanding of the effects of the global crisis 
on the Macedonian economy by using disaggregated, firm-level data. Our goal is 
to empirically test the relative importance of three different channels - the financial 
channel, the export channel and the domestic demand channel, in the context of the 
global crisis. We employ a consistent empirical framework, commonly found in similar 
studies. The dataset consists of balance sheet and income statement indicators for 
194 firms over the 2000-2009period, with annual frequency.
We find a significant negative effect from the domestic demand channel on firm 
performance, while the export channel turns to be insignificant, somewhat contrary to 
the dramatic fall in domestic exports during the crisis. However, once we control for 
sector specifics, we find that exporters of metal products, which constitute almost 30% 
of total exports, had a significantly weaker performance relative to the other exporters 
during the 2009 crisis.  Our results point to the lack of importance of the financial 
channel in transmitting the crisis in the Macedonian economy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II surveys the literature. In Section III we 
provide some insight in the effects of the global crisis on the Macedonian economy as 
seen through macro data. Section IV discusses the dataset. Section V discusses the 
estimation strategy and results and Section VI concludes.
Literature overview
The global financial crisis of 2007, which emerged in developed economies, quickly 
turned into the most severe and synchronized global recession in the last 80 years. 
Both emerging and developing economies were hit severely, although with different 
intensity, reflecting the level of financial integration and the soundness of the 
macroeconomic fundamentals prior to the crisis. As the crisis unfolded over 2008 
and 2009, exports in emerging and developing economies slumped, financial flows 
declined and economic activity contracted sharply.
Recent studies explore the transmission of the crisis across countries, trying to identify 
the key channels and linkages as well as country specifics that enabled a quick global 
spillover of financial and economic shocks from developed economies. One part of 
the literature approaches this issue from the macroeconomic perspective by using 
aggregate data to explain the crisis. By using cross-country regressions, Berkmen et 
al. (2009) find that the severity of the crisis in different economies depends significantly 
on the level of previously cumulated financial vulnerabilities. This particularly holds for 
emerging economies, while for developing economies the export channel proves to 
be important as well, with countries exporting advanced manufacturing goods being 
more affected than those exporting food. Cetoreli and Goldberg (2009) confirm the 
role of the financial channel by showing that global banks played a significant role in 
transmitting the crisis from developed to emerging and developing economies. Similar 
conclusions are reported by Claessens et al. (2010), who try to draw some lessons for 
macroeconomic policy and financial reforms by studying the roots and main contagion 
channels. Blanchard et al. (2010) extend their analysis by exploring the role of the 
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exchange rate regime, foreign reserves holdings and policy stance in emerging and 
developing economies. According to their findings, countries with fixed exchange 
rate regimes have suffered more severely from the crisis as compared to those with 
floating regimes. This is explained with stronger adverse effects that higher holdings 
of short term debt had on countries with fixed exchange rates as compared to their 
floating counterparts. The authors fail to find evidence that foreign reserves holdings 
were an important buffer to the crisis, while the results on the role of the policy stance 
and policy mix are inconclusive. 
Another strand of the literature explores the channels through which global crisis 
materialized by using firm-level data. Advocates of the micro approach argue that 
disaggregated, firm-level data provide better insight into the crisis transmission as they 
contain richer information about individual economic entities with different specifics 
and consequently diverse exposure to shocks. Kamil and Sengupta (2010) exploit 
the heterogeneity of firm-level data on a sample of Latin American countries. They 
study how and to what extent individual firm-level characteristics prior to the crisis, in 
terms of financial positions and international linkages; can explain different corporate 
performance during the crisis. Their results underline the role of the financial channel 
in transmitting the crisis into Latin America, with more leveraged firms suffering more 
from the global shock. In addition, cash-rich firms have weathered the crisis better 
as compared to their counterparts with lower or no cash buffers prior to the crisis, 
while external financial linkages (measured through the share of foreign currency 
denominated debt in total debt) were not an important source of vulnerability during 
the crisis. Their results also confirm the role of the export channel, with exporting firms 
being more adversely affected from the global crisis. Kolasa et al. (2010) focus on the 
performance of Polish firms, particularly the role of individual firm characteristics such 
as ownership status (foreign vs. domestic), size and sector. Their results show that 
membership in large multinational groups has considerably contributed for domestic 
subsidiaries to better cope with the crisis as compared to their domestically-owned 
counterparts, which can mostly be explained with their easy access to external and 
intra-group financing.
Claessenss et al. (2011) examine the impact of the 2007-2009 crisis on firm performance 
and the role of different transmission channels on a sample of 42 advanced emerging 
economies. Using accounting data for 7,722 non-financial firms, they investigate the 
role of three particular channels through which the crisis may have affected firms: the 
financial channel, the demand channel and the export channel. In order to capture 
both cross-firm and cross-country heterogeneity, the authors control for firm specifics 
and country features, such as country exposure to global capital inflows, its overall 
level of financial development and trade openness. Their findings indicate that export 
and demand channels are the most important in transmitting the crisis. With respect 
to country specifics, the results point to trade linkages as the prime propagator of 
shocks, while financial linkages are found to play a considerably weaker role.
Chakraborty (2012) analyzes the channels through which the global crisis affected 
export-oriented firms in India by using income statement and balance sheet indicators 
for around 5,000 manufacturing firms. Results show that the worse export performance 
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of Indian firms is mostly explained by the negative demand shock from India’s major 
trading partners, with the impact being higher for US than the EU. They find no 
significant effects of the international financial constraints on Indian exports. On the 
other hand, domestic financial conditions, accompanied by loose monetary policy, act 
as a supporting factor to export-oriented firms.
Tong and Wei (2008) investigate the spillover of the subprime crisis to a sample of 
U.S. non-financial firms. More specifically, they are interested in two channels through 
which the financial crisis could have influenced the non-financial firms - the consumer 
demand channel and the financial constraint channel. Their results suggest that both 
channels are statistically significant, with the liquidity constraints channel being more 
significant. 
The Macedonian economy during the global crisis
Before the outbreak of the global financial and economic crisis, Macedonia was in the 
expansionary phase of the business cycle, with rapid GDP growth fueled by credit 
growth and high capital inflows from abroad (Table 1 and Figure 1). Annual GDP 
grew by more than 5% between 2006 and 2008, reflecting strong domestic demand 
and increasing foreign direct investments. As economic growth was mainly demand-
driven, it caused an increase in imports and subsequently a sharp widening of the 
current account deficit to around 13% of GDP in 2008. Therefore, large external 
imbalances represented the main vulnerability given the exchange rate peg to the 
euro and the high level of euroization. The banking sector was sound, with no major 
exposures to risky financial instruments on the international financial market, limited 
reliance on external financing and sufficient capital buffers against possible shocks. 
Fiscal policy was also prudent, as budget deficits and public debt were fairly low.  
Table 1. Macedonian main economic indicators
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
GDP (real growth rates) 4,5 -4,5 0,9 2,8 4,6 4,4 5,0 6,1 5,0 -0,9
Inflation (average, on cumulative basis,in %) 5,8 5,5 1,8 1,2 -0,4 0,5 3,2 2,3 8,3 -0,8
Unemployment rate (in %) 32,2 30,5 31,9 36,7 37,2 37,3 36,0 34,9 33,8 32,2
Government Budget balance (Central budget 
and Funds budget balance in % of GDP) 2,5 -6,3 -5,6 -1,0 0,0 0,2 -0,5 0,6 -0,9 -2,7
Money supply M4 (annual growth rates) 19,3 65,0 -11,4 18,6 16,5 15,0 25,0 29,3 11,2 6,0
Credit to the private sector (annual growth 
rates) 16,1 1,1 3,2 19,7 25,0 21,0 30,5 39,2 34,4 3,5
Current account balance (in % of GDP) / / / -4,0 -8,1 -2,5 -0,4 -7,1 -12,8 -6,8
Foreign direct investments in Republic of 
Macedonia (in % of GDP) 6,0 13,0 2,8 2,5 5,9 1,6 6,5 8,6 6,0 2,1
 Gross external debt (in % of GDP) / / / / 51,3 49,8 50,3 51,1 47,4 58,2
Source: National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, State Statistical Office and Ministry of 
Finance.
As a small and open economy heavily dependent on export demand and attracting 
foreign savings to boost domestic investment, the Macedonian economy is highly 
exposed to global shocks. The economy started to slow down gradually at the second 
half of 2008, following the Lehman Brothers collapse, the global financial instability 
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and eventually the global recession. The GDP growth rate was reduced from 6.2% in 
the first quarter of 2008 to only 1.7% in the last quarter, followed by negative growth 
rates throughout 2009. There was also a rapid fall in industrial production of around 
11% in 2009. 
Figure 1. Contribution to annual change in real GDP (in p.p.)
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       Source: State Statistical Office.
The prolonged recession in the Euro-area caused lower foreign demand for 
Macedonian products, leading to a significant deterioration in Macedonian exports 
(Figure 2). Exports of goods and services declined for around 30% during 2009.The 
main exporting industries – metals and textile – were most severely hit by the crisis, 
confirming the role of the external demand channel. For instance, in 2009 only, metal 
exports fell by 56% in nominal terms. The effect of the external demand on metal 
exports was additionally exacerbated by the reversal in commodity prices, which fell 
dramatically after reaching the historical peak in mid-2008. Considerable deterioration 
was also observed in the textile industry, which is the most labor-intensive industry 
in the country. In addition, the falling of the external private financing inflows and the 
rising uncertainties imposed pressures on the exchange rate peg which led to a fall 
of the foreign reserves, by around 30% by mid-2009as compared to end-September 
2008. However, the decisive monetary policy response, higher foreign borrowing by 
the government and the downward adjustment of imports lead to a quick reversal of 
this process. 
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Figure 2. Industrial production (IP) and exports
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Domestic economy contracted by 0.9% in 2009, with domestic demand having the 
largest negative contribution to growth. The lower propensity to consume, in line with 
the higher uncertainty, significantly lower wage growth in 2009 and the restrictive 
credit policy of the banking sector are the key factors that explain the downward 
adjustment in domestic demand. Credit growth registered a significant slowdown in 
2009, reflecting deteriorating economic conditions, heightened uncertainty and rising 
non-performing loans. Although well capitalized and mostly funded with domestic 
sources of financing, the higher risk aversion of domestic banks made them unwilling 
to lend to the private sector, which restrained household consumption, as well as the 
ability of firms to roll over their loans. Total credit increased by only 3.5% in 2009, 
which represents a rapid slowdown from credit growth rates of over 30% prior to 
the crisis. The considerable reduction in bank lending, together with the decreased 
financing from abroad, imposed constraints on firms’ cash-flows and consequently 
on private investment. However, aggregate investment remained relatively resilient 
during the crisis as a result of government capital investments. 
To summarize, macroeconomic data suggest that the contraction of the domestic 
economy could be explained with the collapse of exports, due to the drop in external 
demand, as well as by the decline in private consumption. In addition, worsened 
domestic and international financial conditions also appear to have a negative impact 
on domestic economic activity during the crisis. However, the macroeconomic data 
and descriptive analysis do not enable us to determine which of these channels had 
a more significant impact on firm performance. In order to investigate this issue, we 
proceed with an empirical analysis by using micro-data on individual firms.
The dataset
Most of the studies that investigate the channels through which the crisis may have 
affected individual economies employ aggregate, macro data. Instead, we try to 
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evaluate the financial crisis transmission channels by using disaggregated, micro 
data. The database is constructed from the firm-level data provided by the Central 
Register of the Republic of Macedonia (CRM). In accordance with the legislation, all 
legal entities are required to submit financial statements to the Register of Annual 
Accounts held in the CRM. From this database, balance sheet and income statement 
data were used to create the indicators included in the analysis. Besides financial 
data, the dataset also includes information regarding the number of employees and 
companies’ major area of activity. The dataset constructed in this manner consists 
of 194companies and covers the period from 2000 to 2009. The frequency of data is 
annual. 
This was the only firm-level database readily available to the authors, so we don’t 
have any information whether the firms were chosen randomly or not. The number 
of companies included in our dataset constitutes less than 1% of total number of 
companies operating in the country at the end of 20093. However, these 194 firms 
represent important part of Macedonian corporate sector as their assets account for 
46% (on average for 2006-2009 period) of total assets of the corporate sector4.
All 2-digit NACE5 sectors are included in the dataset. The share of individual sectors 
in the sample is broadly in line with their share in the total corporate gross income 
in the economy. For instance, manufacturing and trade companies have the largest 
shares in our sample (31% and 44%, respectively), while their share in the total 
economy turnover in 2008 was around 32% for manufacturing and 38%, for trade6.At 
the end of 2007, the firms included in the dataset accounted for around 11% of total 
employment7. As shown in Table 2, around 45% of the firms in our sample are small 
firms mostly working in the trade sector. Large and medium size enterprises usually 
belong to the construction and manufacturing sectors.
Table 2. Characteristics of the dataset (2007 data)
Construction Manufacturing Mining Transport Trade Other 
sectors
Total
number of firms in the 
dataset
10 60 4 11 85 24 194
in % 5,2 30,9 2,1 5,7 43,8 12,4
Size, in %
small 30,0 13,3 0,0 36,4 77,7 25,0 44,8
medium and large 
enterprises 70,0 86,7 100,0 63,6 22,4 75,0 55,2
Indebtedness, in %
low to medium 50 63,3 75,0 36,4 45,9 66,7 54,1
high 50 36,7 25,0 63,6 54,1 33,3 45,9
Notes: The firm is considered small if it has less than 100 employees; the firm is highly indebted 
if the ratio of liabilities to assets is higher than 60% (Kolasa et al., 2010).
Next, we review the indebtedness and profitability of the corporate sector in Macedonia 
3  Data on total number of companies in Macedonia are taken from NBRM’s Financial Stability Report for 2009.
4 Data on total assets of Macedonian corporate sector are taken from NBRM’s Financial Stability Reports.
5  NACE is the acronym for National classification for economic activities in the country which is based on the EU 
Classification of economic activities NACE Rev.2.
6  Structural Business Statistics, 2010, State Statistical Office.
7  Total employment as measured by the Labor Force Survey, State Statistical Office.
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in different economic sectors in two periods - the period before the crisis (2007) and 
the crisis period (2009). To that end, we have constructed several financial indicators 
that describe the debt burden of the firms and their profitability:
1. Debt ratio- calculated as total liabilities to total assets;
2. Debt-to-sales ratio- debt burden of the firm over its sales income;
3. Return on assets - net income of the firm over its assets;
4. Earnings before tax to total asset ratio - earning before taxes as a share of 
total assets.
The descriptive analysis of the corporate performance (Figure 3) suggests that: 
•	 The debt burden of the corporate sector did not increase significantly during 
the financial crisis as the debt ratio indicator is quite stable across the sec-
tors8. The debt-to-sales indicator shows certain spikes in some sectors, but 
the detailed examination of the data suggests that this is largely due to the 
decline in firm sales during the crisis, rather than to higher liabilities. 
•	 On the other hand, performance indicators suggest some weakening in firm 
performance as a result of the global crisis. In almost all economic sectors 
there was a decline in the return on assets in 2009, as well as reduced firm 
earnings9, with the manufacturing sector being hit most severely. 
•	 The analysis of the manufacturing sector shows that the producers of metals 
and non-metal minerals10 suffered the most, with negative return on assets 
in 2009. 
8     The significant decline of the debt ratio in mining is a result of the restructuring process of one of the main mining 
capacities in the country. 
9     The better performance of the mining sector, similarly to the case of debt indicators, is a result of the restructuring 
process of one of the main mining capacities in the country.
10   In Figure 3, this sector is included in Manufacturing, rest.
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Figure 3.Corporate Financial Indicators by Sector
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Estimation method and results
The main goal of the research is to explain the effects of the 2009 crisis on the 
Macedonian economy by using firm-level data. More specifically, we aim to determine 
the relative importance of three different channels - the financial channel, the export 
channel and the domestic demand channel. To distinguish between these channels, 
we follow the approach used by Claessens et al. (2011). Namely, if the financial 
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channel was important in the recent crisis, firms whose investment decisions during 
the pre-crisis period had been financed through credits would have worse performance 
relative to firms that had relied on their own resources. If the export channel was 
important, exporters would have a weaker performance in comparison to the other 
firms. Finally, if the global crisis led to a negative domestic demand shock, firms that 
produce and sell on the domestic market would be affected most. 
The estimation method is based on Claessens et al. (2011) and Kamil and Sengupta 
(2010) i.e. firm-performance indicator was regressed on a set of variables which act as 
proxies for the channels mentioned above. The basic empirical specification is as follows:
∆Performancei,j=c+α*Financial Dependencei,j+β*Demand Sensitivityi,j+γ*Tradei,j+ εi,j                (1)
The performance variable is measured by the profit ratio of individual firms. 
Alternatively, one can use sales as an indicator for firm performance (Kamil and 
Sengupta, 2010). Given the primary goal of our research, our dependent variable is 
defined in differences instead of levels, the differences being calculated as а change 
between firm performance after the crisis and firm performance before the crisis. In 
order to define the dependent variable, we need the exact timing of the beginning 
and the end of the crisis. According to the GDP data, the effects of the global crisis 
were transmitted to Macedonia in the fourth quarter in 2008,when GDP fell by 2.1% 
seasonally adjusted compared to the previous quarter. When analyzed by economic 
sectors, one can notice that the crisis started earlier in most sectors. For instance, in 
mining and tourism negative q-o-q rates were registered already in the second quarter, 
whereas in agriculture, transport, trade, construction and in the financial sector q-o-q 
rates were negative in the third quarter of 2008.However, the dataset is of an annual 
frequency, which prevents us from precisely defining the beginning and the end of the 
crisis. Therefore, the change in performance is calculated as the difference between 
the profit ratio in 2009 (post-crisis performance) and the profit ratio in 2007 (pre-crisis 
year).We are using 2007 as a pre-crisis period, because all economic sectors were 
still functioning “normally”. On the other hand, using 2008 as a pre-crisis period would 
probably understate the true negative effect of the crisis due to the fact that, even in 
the first half of the year, one can notice negative movements across various sectors. 
The dependent variable is winsorized at 1% level to reduce the impact of outliers. 
Figure 4. Value added by economic sectors (q-o-q, in %)
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The existing literature employs various measures of the financial dependence 
variable. Rajan and Zingales (1998) use the index of intrinsic dependence on external 
finance for investment. More specifically, they are interested in “the amount of desired 
investment that cannot be financed through internal cash flow generated by the same 
business” [Rajan and Zingales 1998]. Consequently, they calculate the index of 
financial dependence by dividing the difference between a firm’s capital expenditures 
and cash flow by capital expenditures. Raddatz (2006) considers firm financial 
dependence on external finance for working capital. He constructs a proxy for the 
importance of the working capital by calculating the ratio of inventories to sales. The 
higher the value of this measure, the smaller the fraction of inventory investment that 
can be financed by ongoing revenues and therefore the higher the need for external 
financing. In addition, he uses two more measures as a robustness check - the cash 
conversion cycle and the ratio of labor costs to sales. Claessens et al. (2011) uses 
the index of intrinsic dependence on external finance for investment and the cash 
conversion cycle, calculated both on sector and on firm level. 
Bearing this variation in mind, we use several variables in order to capture the financial 
channels: the credit to assets ratio, the inventories to sales ratio and a firm indebtedness 
variable. The two ratios (credits/assets and inventories/sales) are calculated for 2006. 
The choice of 2006 as a reference year is due to the following reasons. In order to 
capture the true effects of the financial channel during the recent crisis, ex ante data 
should be used for the financial variable, i.e. it has to be pre-determined. As noted 
in the literature, during the crisis period, it is difficult to distinguish between different 
transmission channels. For instance, a firm may reduce its exports during the crisis, 
thus leading to a conclusion that the export channel was important. However, the 
reduction of the firm’s exports could also be a result of the lack of working capital (the 
financial channel) rather than the export channel. In other words, ex ante data should 
be used in order to explain ex post firm performance. Further, the firm indebtedness 
variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the credit/assets ratio in 2006 exceeds 
30%, and a value of zero otherwise. In fact, this variable serves as a robustness 
check. Namely, the ratios can be subject to the endogeneity problem - it is possible 
that firms with lower profitability are more indebted. In order to control for this problem, 
we created the firm indebtedness dummy variable and compared the results obtained 
with different financial indicators.
As the domestic demand channel is concerned, Tong and Wei (2008) construct a 
sector-level index by using the stock price reaction of US firms to the September 
11th attack. Their idea is to capture pure firm sensitivity to an unexpected consumer 
confidence shock, i.e. firm’s reaction should not be affected by other shocks (e.g. 
the liquidity shock). Claessens et al. (2011) develop a firm-level demand indicator by 
regressing firm sales on GDP between 2000 and 2006. The estimated coefficients 
are then used as a measure of firms’ demand elasticity. However, a potential problem 
with this approach is the possibility of endogeneity bias due to omitted variables, 
which renders OLS coefficients to be biased. This is due to the fact that firm-level 
regressions do not include any firm-specific variables, such as managers’ talent or 
skills, which are in fact strongly correlated with firm performance. 
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We construct our indicator for the domestic demand to reflect demand sensitivity as 
in Claessens et al. (2011). The idea is that if the global financial crisis triggered a 
negative domestic demand shock then firms that have higher sensitivity to domestic 
demand changes will suffer more. To construct this variable we estimated firm-level, 
OLS regressions of changes in firms’ sale on the changes in domestic demand for 124 
firms for which we have data for the 2000-2009 period (equation 2)11. 
∆ log(Firm salest )=c+β1*∆ log(Domestic demandt )                                              (2)
Next, we use the estimated β1coefficients to create the demand sensitivity variable 
which will be included in the main regression (equation 1) to reflect the domestic 
demand channel. Given that we had data to estimate demand sensitivity coefficients 
only for 124 out of 194 firms we were not able to construct firm level indicator. Instead, 
we’ve created a sector level demand sensitivity indicator meaning that firms in the 
same sector have same sensitivity to domestic demand as in Tong and Wei (2008). 
The estimated β1 coefficients were used to calibrate the values for those firms for 
which we didn’t have enough data to estimate equation 2. In case when we had more 
than one β1coefficient for one sector we average them to create only one value for the 
corresponding sector. A potential problem with our measure of the domestic demand 
channel is that created in this way the demand sensitivity variable is not completely 
predetermined. Namely, when we estimated equation 2 we’ve used the whole sample, 
instead only the pre-crisis period. Hence, rather than representing only domestic 
demand effects, the estimates may contain effects from other transmission channels 
as well. The only way to address this potential problem is to re-estimate equation 2 for 
the same firms with an enlarged database – an option which was not feasible for us. 
Instead, we perform several robustness checks i.e. we estimated several versions of 
the model and we checked the stability of the results regarding the demand sensitivity 
variable. 
Most of the papers that investigate the effects of the global financial crisis are focused 
on the financial channel. To the best of our knowledge, only two papers examine 
the effects of the export channel - Claessens et al. (2011) and Kamil and Sengupta 
(2010). In order to approximate the export channel, Claessens et al. (2011) construct 
sector-level and firm-level trade sensitivity indexes. Alternatively, Kamil and Sengupta 
(2010) create an exporter dummy variable which is equal to one if exports are positive 
and non-missing. We followed these two approaches and constructed two variables. 
The first one is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the firm is an exporter, and 
zero otherwise. The second export variable is calculated in a similar manner as the 
domestic demand sensitivity indicator. Sect oralexport elasticities are calculated by 
using export data for individual sectors according to the Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC). More specifically, we regress changes in nominal exports12on 
changes in foreign demand13 (equation 3). 
11  For the rest 70 firms we have data only for several years and we were not able to obtain meaningful results. 
12  Nominal export, in million of USA dollars.
13  Foreign demand is calculated as a sum of the weighted GDP indexes of Macedonia’s main trading partners, based 
      on each country’s share in Macedonian total export. 
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∆ log(exportt)=c+β2*∆ log(foreign demandt )                                                            (3)
In this case, we are using quarterly data for the 1998-2006 period i.e. only for the 
pre-crisis period. After obtaining estimates for we create the export sensitivity variable 
by attaching these coefficients to the 2-digit NACE sectors, the classification that is 
used in our micro dataset. The export sensitivity variable is used in equation 1 as an 
indicator for the export channel. 
In addition, we use a set of control dummy variables such as a dummy variable for the 
size of the firm and dummy variables for different economic sectors. Table 3 reports 
the results of our analysis.
The primary goal of the research is to identify the relative importance of different 
transmission channels during the 2009 crisis. Therefore, in the first regression (column 
1) we include only the key explanatory variables - the domestic demand, the export 
dummy and the dummy for financial dependence. All three transmission channels 
have the expected, negative effect on firm’s performance during the crisis. However, 
only the domestic demand channel appears to be significant at the conventional 
significance levels. This variable remains significant in different model specifications 
(column 2 - 6). The significance of the domestic demand channel does not come 
as a surprise. Namely, as mentioned previously, the global crisis was translated in 
large, negative domestic demand shock, with domestic demand contracting by 11% 
on cumulative basis in the first quarter of 2010 as compared to the fourth quarter of 
200814. The largest part of this decline (around 85%) can be explained by drop in 
personal consumption and gross investment. The decline in the personal consumption 
and in the demand for investment goods will logically lead to a higher profitability 
loss of those firms that have higher sensitivity to changes in domestic demand. An 
interesting direction for future research would be to distinguish between different 
domestic demand channels - personal consumption channel, investment channel and 
public consumption and to see which of these components was the most important 
during the crisis. This can be done by creating three new variables based on separate 
demand sensitivities. 
14  The comparison captures the difference between the lowest and the highest level of domestic demand, respectively, 
      during the period of the global crisis.
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Table 3. The Impact of Crisis on Firm Performance
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES pa_w1 pa_w1 pa_w1 pa_w1 pa_w1 pa_w1 pa_w1 
        
D_construction    -6.509    
    (5.020)    
D_transport    -2.996    
    (4.870)    
D_trade    -3.527    
    (3.428)    
D_agriculture    -2.234    
    (8.064)    
D_mining    0.726    
    (7.147)    
D_metal    -13.251***    
    (4.158)    
D_food and textile    -3.598    
    (4.147)    
D_manu_rest    -2.348    
    (3.984)    
D_size -1.154 -1.632 0.178 0.580 -0.420 -0.090 1.615 
 (2.118) (2.070) (2.133) (2.366) (2.138) (2.150) (2.905) 
Demand sensitivity -2.369*** -2.319***   -2.015*** -2.030*** -1.954 
 (0.750) (0.757)   (0.767) (0.767) (1.204) 
D_export -1.813  -1.351  -0.534 -0.541 -1.982 
 (2.082)  (2.127)  (2.173) (2.173) (2.815) 
Financial dependence -3.165 -3.253   -3.040   
 (2.338) (2.362)   (2.322)   
Trade sensitivity  -0.250      
  (0.509)      
Metal*D_export     -6.467* -6.560* -6.462* 
     (3.378) (3.377) (3.582) 
Credit/Assets      -0.063  
      (0.049)  
Inventory/Sales       -0.029 
       (0.102) 
Constant 1.889 1.462 -3.041** 0.098 1.030 1.219 -0.220 
 (2.034) (1.980) (1.493) (3.372) (2.069) (2.105) (2.941) 
        
Observations 194 191 194 194 194 194 115 
R-squared 0.063 0.061 0.002 0.065 0.081 0.081 0.092 
Breusch_Pagan_Godfrey        
[p-value] 0.751 0.571 0.734 0.110 0.817 0.644 0.8623 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The export dummy variable, used as a proxy for the export channel, is not statistically 
significant at the conventional levels (column 1). The results remain the same even if we 
replace the export dummy with the alternative export sensitivity variable that is based 
on sector-level trade elasticity (column 2). This comes as a surprise given the high drop 
in exports during the crisis relative to the drop in the domestic demand. However, there 
are two possible explanations that could justify the insignificant estimate for the export 
channel. First, as noted in Claessens et al. (2011), in small and very open economies 
the export channel and the demand channel are highly correlated. If this is the case, 
the significance of the export channel could be underestimated. Nevertheless, the 
export coefficient remains insignificant even if we drop the domestic demand variable 
(column 3). Second, while it is true that there was a significant decline in aggregate 
exports during the financial crisis, the decline was not symmetrically distributed across 
different sectorsi.e. the fall in the aggregate exports is almost entirely explained by 
the reduced metal exports which declined by 56% compared to 2007, while exports 
from all other sectors fell by only 1%.In order to account for different impact of the 
crisis across economic sectors, we include dummy variables for each sector (column 
4). Results show that being a metal producer resulted in a significant decline of the 
profitability during 2009 as compared to the other sectors i.e. if a firm is a metal 
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producer then its performance during the crisis was worse than the firms from other 
sectors for 13.3%. Next, we test whether there is a significant difference between 
firms in the metal industry that are also exporters and the other exporters (column 5). 
The results confirm that metal exporters had significantly weaker performance during 
the crisis, as they were disproportionally hit during the crisis compared to the other 
exporters. In addition, these results point to the relatively high level of concentration 
of exports as one of the main weaknesses of the Macedonian economy, since around 
50% of Macedonian exports between 2003 and 2011 have been concentrated in only 
two sectors: iron and steel, and textiles. The 2009 crisis showed that shocks affecting 
the dominant sectors have huge detrimental effects on aggregate exports. Therefore, 
it is important to promote and enforce further structural policies aimed towards higher 
degree of export diversification.
The dummy for financial dependence has the expected negative sign but it is 
insignificant at the conventional levels, suggesting that there was no significant 
difference in the performance of the firms in 2009 due to their indebtedness level. 
Alternatively we tried the other measures for financial dependence, such as the credit 
to assets ratio and the inventories to sales ratio (columns 6 and 7), but none of them 
turn out to be significant leading to a conclusion that during 2009 firms that were in 
more fragile financial condition before the crisis did not experience higher drop in 
profitability compared to the rest of the firms. This result does not come as a surprise. 
Namely, the global financial crisis affected the Macedonian economy directly through 
the real sector.This is in line with the significant coefficients on the domestic demand 
and the export channels (for the metal sector). On the other hand, there was no direct 
effect from the global financial crisis to the Macedonian financial sector. Macedonian 
banking sector remained sound and stable. Banks’ lending was reduced but this came 
as a result of the increased risk aversion of the banks in line with the weak economic 
outcomes. Firms’ profitability in 2009 was already reduced as a result of a weaker 
demand – domestic and foreign. In other words, the financial position of the firms 
before the crisis was not the reason for the reduced profitability i.e. firms did not need 
any additional external financing because their production had already been reduced 
as a response to the demand contraction. Finally, the dummy variable for firm size 
does not appear significant in any specification, indicating that the difference in firms’ 
performance during the crisis cannot be attributed to their size. 
Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the impact of the global financial crisis on the Macedonian 
economy by evaluating the relative importance of three transmission channels: the 
domestic demand channel, the export channel and the financial channel. Unlike most 
studies that use aggregated data, we use a unique, disaggregated; firm-level dataset 
based on balance sheet and the income statement data.
We analyze changes in the performance of Macedonian firms during the crisis by 
looking at the ex-ante firm characteristics. In order to do so, we create several different 
proxies to capture the effects of the three transmission channels. Our results show 
a significant negative effect of the domestic demand channel, suggesting that firms 
that have higher sensitivity to changes in domestic demand had relatively weaker 
performance than the rest of the firms. This finding is in line with the macroeconomic 
data, according to which domestic demand fell significantly during the crisis. On 
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the other hand, we did not find significant impact of the export channel, although 
exports declined dramatically during the crisis. However, this negative shock was 
quite asymmetric across export sectors. Once we control for this characteristic, we 
find evidence that metal exporters, which constitute almost 30% of total exports, 
had weaker performance during the 2009 crisis relative to other exporters. This 
result suggests that new structural policies aimed towards export diversification 
should be promoted and enforced further. The financial channel is insignificant in all 
specifications, indicating that there was no significant difference in firms’ performance 
on the basis of their indebtedness level before the crisis. 
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